Lebanon, Three Years After
12.07.09
Elliot Chodoff
The Second Lebanon War began three years ago today, with an attack by Hizbullah across the Israeli border. Ambushing a border patrol, Hizbullah killed 5 IDF soldiers, took two of the bodies of those killed with them back to Lebanon, and fired rockets at civilian and military targets in Northern Israel. Five additional soldiers were killed in an attempted rescue of the soldiers grabbed by Hizbullah, since it was not yet known that they had been killed in the initial attack.
The Israeli government, after 6 years of a policy of restraint vis a vis Hizbullah attacks, decided to escalate, and launched the most strategically mismanaged war in Israel's history. When it ended 5 weeks later, despite impressive performances by the air force and the small units of the ground forces, Israel had achieved none of its stated strategic objectives while its high command and political leadership errors gave the impression that the IDF was, as Hizbullah leader Hassan Nasrallah had termed it in 2000, nothing more than a "spider's web."
There had been serious doctrinal, command, and conceptual flaws in the IDF leading up to the war, but, immediately upon its conclusion, IDF officers of all ranks began the painstaking process of evaluating performance and working on corrective measures. Numerous generals resigned their commissions, leading to a new wave of commanders in the field and the general staff who were committed to ensuring that the errors of 2006 not be repeated.
How well have they done? Operation Cast Lead in Gaza in January 2009 seems to indicate that many of the shortcomings have been addressed satisfactorily. Combined arms operations were executed as smoothly as war permits, Hamas booby-traps were effectively neutralized by the air force and the engineering corps, reservists and regulars alike were well trained and equipped to accomplish their missions. Hamas was overwhelmed, and, despite Israel's detractors' claims to the contrary, noncombatant casualties were kept to a minimum, under the circumstances of combat in an urban battlefield.
However, Hizbullah also rebuilt and rearmed after the war. New recruits were sent to Iran for training and indoctrination, and some have recently learned additional "political management" techniques, assisting the thugs of the Iranian regime to keep order in Tehran after the election farce. Hizbullah's arsenal of rockets, numbering some 15,000 before the 2006 war, has been replenished; estimates place its numbers in the 50-60,000 range, with ranges that place most of Israel's population centers under threat. South Lebanon, cleared of Hizbullah forces after the war, is witnessing their return, as they enter the region's villages and repeat their hallmark tactic of digging in amongst the civilian population. The UN force in the south (UNIFIL), charged with keeping Hizbullah's armed troops out, will not confront them, nor will it enter the villages to chec k on the extent of new Hizbullah fortifications.
On the political level, the picture is also far from optimistic. Hizbullah managed to claim victory, while getting the world to condemn Israel for the damage caused in the fighting. More important, the operation failed interdicting the flow of arms from Iran, via Syria into Lebanon, despite promises by the UN that Hizbullah would be disarmed.
Worst of all, perhaps, is the fact that the world in general, and the Israeli government in particular, has resigned itself to living with the reality that Hizbullah can call the shots in Lebanon and plunge the region into war any time, at its discretion or on the orders of its Iranian masters.
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The Second Lebanon War began three years ago today, with an attack by Hizbullah across the Israeli border. Ambushing a border patrol, Hizbullah killed 5 IDF soldiers, took two of the bodies of those killed with them back to Lebanon, and fired rockets at civilian and military targets in Northern Israel. Five additional soldiers were killed in an attempted rescue of the soldiers grabbed by Hizbullah, since it was not yet known that they had been killed in the initial attack.
The Israeli government, after 6 years of a policy of restraint vis a vis Hizbullah attacks, decided to escalate, and launched the most strategically mismanaged war in Israel's history. When it ended 5 weeks later, despite impressive performances by the air force and the small units of the ground forces, Israel had achieved none of its stated strategic objectives while its high command and political leadership errors gave the impression that the IDF was, as Hizbullah leader Hassan Nasrallah had termed it in 2000, nothing more than a "spider's web."
There had been serious doctrinal, command, and conceptual flaws in the IDF leading up to the war, but, immediately upon its conclusion, IDF officers of all ranks began the painstaking process of evaluating performance and working on corrective measures. Numerous generals resigned their commissions, leading to a new wave of commanders in the field and the general staff who were committed to ensuring that the errors of 2006 not be repeated.
How well have they done? Operation Cast Lead in Gaza in January 2009 seems to indicate that many of the shortcomings have been addressed satisfactorily. Combined arms operations were executed as smoothly as war permits, Hamas booby-traps were effectively neutralized by the air force and the engineering corps, reservists and regulars alike were well trained and equipped to accomplish their missions. Hamas was overwhelmed, and, despite Israel's detractors' claims to the contrary, noncombatant casualties were kept to a minimum, under the circumstances of combat in an urban battlefield.
However, Hizbullah also rebuilt and rearmed after the war. New recruits were sent to Iran for training and indoctrination, and some have recently learned additional "political management" techniques, assisting the thugs of the Iranian regime to keep order in Tehran after the election farce. Hizbullah's arsenal of rockets, numbering some 15,000 before the 2006 war, has been replenished; estimates place its numbers in the 50-60,000 range, with ranges that place most of Israel's population centers under threat. South Lebanon, cleared of Hizbullah forces after the war, is witnessing their return, as they enter the region's villages and repeat their hallmark tactic of digging in amongst the civilian population. The UN force in the south (UNIFIL), charged with keeping Hizbullah's armed troops out, will not confront them, nor will it enter the villages to chec k on the extent of new Hizbullah fortifications.
On the political level, the picture is also far from optimistic. Hizbullah managed to claim victory, while getting the world to condemn Israel for the damage caused in the fighting. More important, the operation failed interdicting the flow of arms from Iran, via Syria into Lebanon, despite promises by the UN that Hizbullah would be disarmed.
Worst of all, perhaps, is the fact that the world in general, and the Israeli government in particular, has resigned itself to living with the reality that Hizbullah can call the shots in Lebanon and plunge the region into war any time, at its discretion or on the orders of its Iranian masters.
Mideast: On Target never sends SPAM. You received this message either because you are a subscriber or it has been forwarded to you. You may safely add our e-mail address to your "Safe Sender" list.